Post-quantum readiness starts with your suppliers: the questions CISOs should be asking now
Most security leaders have accepted that the move to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is coming. Fewer have worked out how much of it sits outside their own control. Your cloud platforms, managed service providers, identity services, backup tools, network kit and building systems all make cryptographic choices on your behalf. If they are not ready, neither are you.
Two publications in the past three weeks make that point very directly, and both give CISOs something practical to work with.
What has been published
A ready-made set of vendor questions. On 5 November 2026, the Australian Signals Directorate's Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD's ACSC), working with the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the National Security Agency (NSA), published "Post-quantum questions to ask your vendors", with a shorter quick reference list alongside it. The questions are vendor-neutral and are meant for procurement, contract renewals and ongoing vendor assurance. The agencies say the aim is to find out whether a supplier understands quantum-related risk, is open about how it uses cryptography, and can support a "secure, cost-effective and timely transition to PQC".
UK financial regulators set out what good looks like. On 19 November 2026, the Prudential Regulation Authority, the Financial Conduct Authority and the Bank of England published "effective practices" on managing cyber risk linked to quantum computing. They sit alongside a new consultation on cyber resilience guidance for financial services firms, which closes on 26 February 2027. The quantum material is not part of the regulators' formal expectations, but it is a clear statement of what they consider sensible preparation. One line will matter to every CISO who relies on outsourcing: "The firm remains accountable for managing quantum-related cyber risk where the relevant systems or services are provided by a third party."
Both documents fit with the UK's existing timeline. The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) has asked organisations to define their migration goals, carry out a full discovery exercise and build an initial plan by 2028, to complete their highest-priority migration work by 2031, and to finish migrating all systems, services and products by 2035.
Why this is a supply chain problem
The quantum threat is easy to file under "later". No cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) is known to exist today, as the UK regulators note. But they also point to "harvest now, decrypt later" attacks, where data is stolen in encrypted form now and decrypted once the technology arrives. Any data that has to stay confidential for many years, such as customer records or intellectual property, is already exposed to that risk.
The harder issue is lead time. The agencies behind the vendor guidance point out that cryptography is often built into systems that are difficult to update and tied to long asset lifecycles, such as industrial control systems, access control, building management and Internet of Things devices. Some of these may need firmware changes or full hardware replacement. If you only find that out in 2030, you have very few options left.
That is why both publications push engagement with suppliers to the front of the plan, rather than leaving it until your own teams are ready to migrate.
Five sets of questions to put to your vendors
The vendor guidance is organised around five phases of a PQC transition, taken from ASD's LATICE framework. It works as a checklist for your next supplier review.
1. Locate. Ask whether the vendor keeps a current inventory of its cryptographic dependencies, such as a cryptographic bill of materials (CBOM). Ask where cryptography is implemented across software, firmware and hardware, whether any of it is hardcoded or hardware bound, and whether third-party components bring in cryptography of their own. Ask how cryptography is updated: through normal patches, or only through replacement.
2. Assess. Ask which of your data flows rely on traditional public-key cryptography, what the product assumes about how long your data needs to stay confidential, and whether the vendor has a documented, product-specific assessment of quantum risk. A good answer separates signing, encryption and authentication, because each carries different risks and timelines.
3. Triage. Ask for product-specific, versioned dates for PQC-ready releases, and which components will need hardware replacement or re-architecture. If the vendor supports hybrid modes that combine traditional and post-quantum algorithms, ask when it plans to move to PQC only. The agencies are clear that hybrid should be a temporary step. Ask, too, how the vendor decides which customers come first. The guidance says this should rest on risk, "rather than customer size or revenue".
4. Implement. Ask which standards-based algorithms will be supported and when, whether the implementation is production-ready rather than a preview, how cryptographic libraries are validated and maintained, and how larger keys and certificates will affect performance and operations. One question deserves a straight answer early: is PQC included in base licensing? The agencies warn against security controls being paywalled.
5. Communicate. Ask how you will be told about cryptographic changes, whether the vendor will provide customer-ready transition guides, how traditional cryptography will be retired, and whether its support and engineering teams are trained to help.
The guidance accepts that many vendors will not have complete answers yet. It suggests that a supplier's willingness to engage openly, explain its constraints and show progress is itself a useful sign of maturity. It also lists warning signs to watch for, including limited visibility of cryptographic use, reliance on general assurances, unclear or deferred timelines, proprietary or opaque cryptography, PQC treated as an optional or premium feature, over-reliance on compensating controls and a lack of governance or ownership.
What CISOs can do this quarter
Build PQC into procurement and renewals now. Contracts signed in the next year or two may run well past 2028. The UK regulators suggest firms review their procurement processes and contracts with material third parties, covering cryptographic dependencies, PQC readiness and changes that could affect the firm. Adding a short set of questions from the vendor guidance to your standard due diligence is a low-cost place to start.
Start the cryptographic inventory and include third parties. The regulators describe the inventory as the basis for assessing risk and planning migration, covering applications, databases, APIs, certificates, PKI, authentication, backups, networks and operational technology, as well as dependencies on suppliers. The NCSC's 2028 milestone for discovery is closer than it sounds for a large estate.
Prioritise by data lifetime and criticality. Focus first on data that has to stay confidential for a long time and on the services whose disruption would hurt most. The regulators also suggest taking account of legacy constraints and how long each change will take.
Give the board a clear picture. The regulators suggest that boards should agree a documented migration plan with milestones and dates, and receive regular information on progress, including third-party readiness. A simple dashboard showing how many critical suppliers have answered your PQC questions, and how well, would give the board a clear view.
Plan for change going wrong. The regulators recommend testing the ability to reverse changes safely and checking that systems do not quietly fall back to cryptography that a quantum computer could break. Build that into change control from the start.
Design for crypto-agility. Individual algorithms may weaken as the field develops. When you buy, build or upgrade systems, ask how easily the cryptography can be swapped out later. That question will outlast this migration.
The bottom line
Post-quantum migration is often described as a cryptography project. In practice, for most organisations, it is a supplier management project with a long tail. The guidance published this month gives CISOs a ready-made question set and a clear signal from UK regulators that accountability stays with you, even when the technology belongs to someone else. The organisations that start asking now will have time to act on the answers.
Sources
- Post-quantum questions to ask your vendors, ASD's ACSC with CISA and NSA, 5 November 2026 (cyber.gov.au)
- Post-Quantum Questions to Ask Your Vendors, CISA resource page, 5 November 2026
- Effective practices: Cyber risk and resilience management relating to quantum computing, PRA, FCA and Bank of England, 19 November 2026
- Cyber resilience guidance consultation and AI and quantum effective practices, Bank of England news release, 19 November 2026
- Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography, National Cyber Security Centre
Image: Brett Sayles on Pexels (Pexels License).


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